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Abstract: The evolution of the system of sources ruling the institution of contract
is a highly sensitive topic amongst Italian scholars. Contract law is no longer a
system of rules and structures requiring conformity, but it is encrusted with case
law and doctrine. Norms often lack a statutorily-governed situation required by
law. Instead of a judgment whether conduct conforms to a given rule, what is
required instead is the balancing of different values. A different legal order, based
on new values, is coming. Justice in trials and the fairness of contracts are no
longer invoked as tools to protect class interests, but as a way to express constitu-
tional values. By the so called ‘fair decision’s’ argument, the principles of trial
procedure construct a new set of judicial decisions. Fairness in contract becomes
an essential tool through the principle of an effective remedy (Article 24 Italian
Constitution, Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, Article 47 CFREU). The new legal order is
based on both legal rules and legal principles. The former are a prius instead of a
posterius. They guide judges, lawyers and scholars and give them directions on
the objective to pursue. This is made possible by a new and rigorous argumenta-
tive technique: a different relationship between facts and values, the centrality of
the principle of reasonableness, the attention to in the European Courts and the
‘conscious’ use of the techniques of Community law. The relationship between
the legislative function and the implementation of rules and principles is chan-
ging and, nowadays, they are on an equal footing. This has direct consequence
both on the ‘democratic form’ and contract law, which is becoming more and
more different from that of the 20th century.
Résumé: L’évolution des sources du droit en matière de contrat est un thème très
sensible dans la doctrine italienne. Le droit des contrats n’est plus un système
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hiérarchisé de règles et d’institutions, mais relève de la jurisprudence et de
l’interprétation doctrinale. Les normes appliquées manquent souvent de statut
legal et conduisent plutôt à une mise en balance de valeurs différentes qu’à
l’application déductive d’une règle. Il faut y voir le signe de l’avènement d’un
ordre juridique different, basé sur de nouvelles valeurs. La justice procédurale et
contractuelle ne constitue plus un outil de protection des intérêts catégoriels mais
permettent d’exprimer des valeurs constitutionnelles. A travers l‘argument de la
“décision juste”, les principes processuels construisent une nouvelle jurispru-
dence. La justice dans le contrat se réalise par le prncipe du droit à un remède
effectif (Art. 24 de la Constitution italienne, arts 6 et 13 de la CEDH, art. 47 CFRUE).
L’ordre nouveau est fondé sur les règles et des principes juridiques. Ces derniers
s’imposent a priori, et non ex post. Ils guident les juges et les interprètes et leur
indique des objectifs à poursuivre. Ceci es t rendu possible par une technique
argumentative nouvelle et rigoureuse: une reconfiguration des faits et des va-
leurs, la centralité du principe du raisonnable, l’autorité des cours européennes
et l’utilisation consciente des techniques du droit de l’Union. La relation entre la
function legislative et la mise en oeuvre de règles et de principes est en train de
changer, de sorte qu’aujourd’hui, ils sont sur un pied d’égalité. Ceci a une
incidence sur la forme démocratique et le contenu du droit des contrats, qui
s’éloigne de plus en plus de celui du vingtième siècle.
Zusammenfassung: Die Frage danach, wie sich das System des Vertragsrechts
insgesamt fortentwickelt, ist eine hochkontrovers Diskutierte in Italien. Vertrags-
recht wird nicht mehr als ein System von Regeln und Strukturen gesehen, das sich
durch Widerspruchslosigkeit auszeichnet und von diesem Aspekt her konzipiert
werden kann, sondern als ein System zwischen Fallrecht und Doktrin. Normen
geben häufig keine Antwort, die klar gesetzlich verankert wäre und es solcher-
maßen erlauben würde, ihre Normkonformität eindeutig zu bestimmen oder
vorherzusagen. Vielmehr ist für die Lösung des Falles eine Abwägung vonWerten
nötig. Eine andere Art Rechtsordnung, basierend auf neuen Werten, ist im En-
tstehen. Gerechtigkeit im Gerichtssaal und im Vertragsrecht werden nicht mehr
primär als Instrumente gesehen, die Individual- oder Gruppeninteressen schützen
sollen, sondern als Ausdruck von Verfassungswerten. Durch das sog. „fair deci-
cion’s“ Argument werden die Verfahrensprinzipien zu einem neuen Cluster von
Entscheidungsgruppen gebündelt. Ein fairer Vertrag zeichnet sich vor allem
durch eine effiziente Durchsetzung aus (Art. 24 der italienischen Verfassung,
Art. 6 und 3 EGMRK und Art. 47 Gemeinsamer Referenzrahmen). Die neue Re-
chtsordnung verbindet Rechtsnormen und Rechtsprinzipien. Die Letztgenannten
kommen heute auch zuerst, sie führen den Richter, Praktiker und Wissenschaftler
und geben ihm eine Zielrichtung, die er verfolgt. Dies wird durch eine neue
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Argumentationstechnik ermöglicht: Zwischen Tatsachen und Prinzipien besteht
ein neues Verhältnis, gekennzeichnet durch das insoweit ganz zentrale Konzept
der „Reasonableness“, dem der EuGH und die Europäischen Gerichte besonderes
Gewicht zumessen. Die Beziehung zwischen der Gesetzgebungsfunktion und
ihrer Umsetzung in Prinzipien und Regeln ändert sich heutzutage, sie stehen sich
zunehmend „auf Augenhöhe“ gegenüber. Dies zeitigt seine Wirkung sowohl im
Hinblick auf den „demokratischen Prozess“ und auf das Vertragsrecht – die beide
zunehmend anders werden als wir dies im 20. Jahrhundert kannten.
1 Going beyond the situation required by law
(fattispecie)
Legal sciences are increasingly studying the ongoing changes to the sources of
the legal system1 within the current historical context, which is marked by
extremely clear events. These developments include the reestablishment of a
strong bond between law and society, the erosion of the State’s legislative
monism, and the production of law which is increasingly less ‘legal and mostly
delegated to the interpretation of Courts and legal scholars’.2 This has a direct
consequence.
Legal scholars are increasingly assessing the changes occurring to the meth-
od and techniques of private law. The crisis of the situation required by law is
marked by an intense and refined analysis aimed at scrutinizing the past and
present world.
1 See for instance the issue related to the interplay between the newly enacted legislation on the
economic and monetary union and the existing EU treaties. On this point L.F.M. Besselink,
‘Parameters of constitutional development: The fiscal compact in between EU and member state
constitutions’, in L.S. Rossi and F. Casolari (eds), The EU after Lisbon: amending or coping with the
existing treaties? (Cham: Springer: 2014) 21–35. Another example might be the US debate over the
legitimacy of citation to foreign sources of law by the Supreme Court: See on this point: D. Zaring,
‘The Use Of Foreign Decisions By Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis’ 3 Journal of Empirical
Legal Studies 297 (2006); S.G. Calabresi and S.D. Zimdahl, ‘The Supreme Court and Foreign
Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision’ 47
William&Mary Law Review 743 (2005).
2 P. Grossi, ‘Sulla odierna “incertezza” del diritto’ www.giustiziacivile.com (2014). On this point,
the ECJ is for instance increasingly granting more and more power to national courts to enforce
the charter of foundamental rights see European Court of Justice 26 February 2013, case 617/2010,
Åklagaren vHans Åkerberg Fransson [2013], ECR 2013–00000.
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On the one hand, the past system is examined. It was designed to create
certain structures in order to defeat uncertainty and ‘dominate the unpredictable’,
through ‘a simplifying system of types’, enabling the rule ‘to anticipate the reality’
and ‘conquer the future’, with ‘certainty and predictability’. On the other hand,
the changes occurring to the constitutional State are also considered, where rules
without a situation required by law may lead the interpreter to ‘rise from law to
values’. Accordingly, legal reasoning follows other paths. The positive system is
replaced by an ‘objective system of substantive values’, where rules are no longer
self-sufficient, but they are rather justified and supported by something else that
can somehow use them. This is a reference to values, which ‘have cancelled the
problem of gaps’, since values ‘are worth in and for themselves, they do not need
other rules or intermediate mechanisms; they rely only on themselves’. All of this,
as it is clearly argued, does not prevent the work of jurists. They only need to
continue their work under a new horizon.3
It is just a matter of specifying how. Italian law is a codified system. The
codification is from the fascist era, often amended since then, but nevertheless it
constitutes a good example because the constitutional values as such have been
enacted mostly posterior to the codification itself. Therefore the interplay between
rules and values – with a potential supremacy of the values, but at the same time
more precise definition of the rules – can be found in Italian law in particular. The
same is certainly true for Germany, and it is not by chance that these are the only
two jurisdictions in the European Union where also the influence of fundamental
rights on private law is experienced most directly.4
3 N. Irti, ‘La crisi della fattispecie’ Rivista di diritto processuale 1 (2014) 38 et seq; N. Irti, ‘Calcol-
abilità Weberiana e crisi della fattispecie’ Rivista di diritto civile 2014, 987 et seq but also
M. Hesselink, ‘The general principles of civil law: Their nature, roles and legitimacy. In the
involvement of EU law in private law relationships’, in D. Leczykiewicz and S. Weatherill (eds),
The Involvement of EU Law in Private Law Relationships (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) 131–180;
G. Alpa, ‘I “principi generali del diritto civile” nella giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia’
Giustizia civile 2 (2014) 325 et seq. D. Kennedy, ‘The political stakes in “Merely technical” issues of
contract law’ European Review of Contract Law 2002, 7–28.
4 On the following seemore extensively: O. Cherednyschenko, Fundamental Rights, Contract Law
and the Protection of the Weaker Party – a Comparative Analysis of the Constitutionalisation of
Contract Law, with Emphasis on Risky Financial Transactions (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2007);
O. Cherednyschenko, ‘EU Fundamental Rights, EC Fundamental Freedoms, and Private Law’
(2006) 14 European Review of Private Law 23–61; S. Grundmann (ed), Constitutional Values and
European Contract Law (Alphen: Kluwer Law International, 2007); in this volume, see also
G. Vettori, ‘The Institutional Perspective: the European Economic and Social Constitution and the
Role of Contract Law’, in Grundmann (ed), this note, 205–214.
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Rights, principles, and contractual rebalancing. Courts are aware of these
recent developments and, after having followed the positivist closed approach,
have stepped back by dealing with the regulation of contracts in different times
and places.
Two recent rulings of the Italian Constitutional Court,5 which have endorsed
a well-established approach of the Italian Court of Cassation, have strengthened
the role of constitutional principles in contract regulation.
The opportunity was provided by a case concerning the regulation of a
confirmation deposit, whose unconstitutionality was maintained in relation to the
part of the provision making the Court unable to reduce the payable amount
‘where it is blatantly disproportionate’. The petitioner argued that the rule (Article
1385 of the Italian Civil Code) did not leave the Court any room for interpretation
in order to restore objective fairness and the overall contractual balance.6 The
Court rejected such argument in two rulings providing a constitutional interpreta-
tion of great impact and importance, going beyond the issue at stake related to
the confirmation deposit. It is sufficient to read the plain text of the rulings.
The inadmissibility was held because the petitioner did not take into account
‘the possible room for Court’s intervention should there be a clause mirroring (as in
the present case) an unfair regulation of opposing interests, highly unbalanced up
to the detriment of one party’. In such cases, the Court can automatically intervene
by declaring ‘the clause (totally or partially) void pursuant to Article 1418 of the
Civil Code, being in conflict with Article 2 of the Constitution (concerning the
mandatory duty of solidarity) which is directly incorporated into the contract and,
together with the principle of good faith, is assigned with statutory power’7.The
authoritative nature of these holdings leads us to analyze in more detail their
grounds. The above-mentioned precedents recall a well-established approach.
5 Constitutional Court, 24 October 2013, n 248 and 22 April 2014, n 77. Constitutional Court cases
can be accessible through the official website of the Court at: http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/
actionPronuncia.do providing the number and year of the case. In the official website, you may
find also an English version of a number of selected judgments at http://www.cortecostituzio
nale.it/ActionPagina_1260.do.
6 Constitutional Court, 22 April 2014, ibid.
7 The Court upheld the power of the constitutional provision to functionalize ‘the duty to also the
interest of the negotiating partner so far as to the extent that it does not collide with the interest of
the obligor’, with reference to previous case law: Decision n 10511/1999; n 3775/1994 and, the
Court (plenary session), rulings n 18128/2005 and n 20106/2009. Court of Cassation cases for the
last 5 years can be freely accessible through the official website of the Court at: http://www.italgi
ure.giustizia.it/sncass/ providing the number and year of the case. Older cases can be accessible
through the legal database http://www.italgiure.giustizia.it/index_it.asp that require specific
credentials.
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a) The excessive penalty clause. The first ruling8 concerned the possibility for
the Court to raise the issue of the penalty clause of its own motion, but it gives us
also the opportunity to think again about the corrective power of the Court before
a private act or conduct which does not comply with the constitutional system in
force. Yet, there is more. The ground of the decision aims to expressly overcome
the formalism of previous case-law and to reinterpret the rules of private law in a
manner that complies with constitutional rules and principles. This is done with a
precise purpose: to overcome the idea of the centrality of the parties’ will in order
to emphasize the prime interest of the system to oversight private autonomy via
the Courts. The latter should take into account the balancing of ‘values’ of equal
constitutional importance, which ultimately converge into the contract. Reference
is made to Article 41 of the Italian Constitution, which recognizes economic free-
dom, and to the duty of solidarity under Article 2 of the Italian Constitution, which
is incorporated – as stated – into the contract, as an internal limit to any legal
position, and which passes on, through good faith, into the process of assessing
the party’s behaviour, so to allow the Court to reject claims based on contractual
obligations, as well as to evaluate the compliance, on the basis of such balancing
process, of the very existence of the contractual relationship.9 This is the logical
premise that justifies the Court’s intervention of its own motion, as the expression
of a power-duty not designed to protect a particular contractual party, but rather
to achieve an objective interest of the legal system, ‘which becomes specific and
concrete in the need for “justice in each single case” to be ensured by the trial’.10
Courts have not always endorsed such approach. Many subsequent rulings
have indeed confirmed the traditional argument.11 A Court of Cassation’s (plenary
session) ruling was thus needed which sharply confirmed this innovative ap-
proach in detail, and rejected all the exegetic-logic arguments against it, in order
to affirm the scope and limits of the Courts’ intervention.
The Court found no obstacle arising from Article 112 of the Italian Code of
Civil Procedure since the provision related to the penalty clause (Article 1384 of
the Civil Code) does not specifically require a party’s objection, therefore the
opposite solution can be traced from a systematic assessment of other similar
8 Court of Cassation, 24 September 1999, n 10511 (2000) I Foro italiano 1930.
9 Court of Cassation, n 3362/1989 (1989) I Foro italiano 2750, n 2503/1991 (on an omnibus surety)
(1991) I Foro italiano 2077, n 6448/1994 (1995) I Foro italiano 188.
10 Court of Cassation, 24 September 1999, n 10511 (2000) I Foro italiano 1930.
11 Court of Cassation, 4 April 2003, n 5324 (2003) Giustizia civile Massimario 4; Court of Cassa-
tion, 30 May 2003, n 8813 (2003) Giustizia civile Massimario 5; Court of Cassation, 19 April 2002,
n 5691 (2003) I Giustizia Civile 1075; Court of Cassation, 27 October 2000, n 14172 (2001) I Foro
italiano 2924.
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cases (Article 1526 and Article 1934 of the Civil Code). The Court held that any
intervention of the Court’s own motion should never be aimed at protecting a
particular legal position, but rather a general interest shared in other cases where
the corrective action of the Courts is provided for by the law (Article 2058 and
Article 1226 of the Civil Code). In short, the Court addresses the party’s autonomy
and its limits that justify the Courts’ corrective action. There are cases, the Court
argued, where ‘the correction of the parties’ will’ is provided by law, which
automatically replaces the unfair contract term. There are other cases where
automatic correction provided by the statutory rules is not possible ‘since the
performance due by one of the parties cannot be established in advance’. In such
cases, ‘the extent of the performance is left to the Court’s decision in order to
avoid cases where parties may use legal instruments to reach an objective that is
not allowed by the legal system or that is not considered worth to be protected, as
exemplified in the present case by the “manifestly excessive” penalty clause’.12
Therefore, the corrective power serves a specific purpose: to bring back the
agreement, ‘which is the result of the parties’ freely expressed will, within the
limits where it appears to be worthy to receive protection by the legal system.’
This is fully consistent with the Court’s power to hold by its own motion the non-
conformity of a clause with the sources of an integrated legal system.
b) Abuse of law. The latter ruling mentioned above completes the picture13 by
establishing the theme concerning the abuse of law within the scope of objective
good faith. It is worth recalling that the concept of objective good faith is
epitomized by the constitutional value of social solidarity; it operates in the
process of contract formation and execution, and it represents an instrument of
control for the Court in order to ensure that ‘the legal relationship is balanced and
proportionate’.
There follows our first conclusion. The strictly formalistic conception main-
tained by the trial ruling under appeal must be rejected. Such an approach denies
the Court’s control over the act of autonomy (in that case, in connection with a
contract withdrawal ad nutum), rules out the possibility that good faith may
create autonomous obligations, and emphasizes, in a market economy, that the
parties’ autonomy should not be subject to a reasonableness control. The rejec-
tion of this approach by the Court of Cassation is very clear.
Abuse is a criterion suggesting bad faith and which demonstrates an ‘altered
use of the formal scheme of law, aimed at achieving further and different goals
from those provided by the legislator’. Accordingly, an abusive conduct occurs
12 Court of Cassation (plenary session), 13 September 2005, n 18128 (2005) I Foro italiano 2985.
13 Court of Cassation, 18 September 2009, n 20106 (2010) I Foro italiano 85.
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where ‘in the connection between the power of autonomy… and its enforcement,
the objective function of the act is altered with respect to the power that envisages
it’. In such cases, the legal system does not provide any protection to rights and
interests ‘exercised in a manner that is contrary to objective good faith, and it
prevents the achievement and retention of benefits arising from acts which, albeit
instrumentally suitable, are exercised in such a way as to alter the function and
being in contrast’ with fairness. From all this, a principle arises, allowing Courts
to assess whenever any act and conduct exceed the internal and external limits of
the law. The method to adopt is also quite clear. In the case of conflicting
interests, ‘the proportionality of the means used’ is essential, and requires ‘a
proceduralization of the enforcement of law’.
2 Fair judgments’ in the Court of Cassation
decisions
The Court of Cassation has been increasingly using the ‘ordering principle of a fair
judgment’.14
First of all, and this is quite innovative with respect to the past, according to
this principle the trial court is responsible for declaring all types of voidness of its
own motion since such assessments are based ‘on the protection of general
interests, fundamental values or values going beyond the interests of indivi-
duals’.15 In other cases,16 the Court makes a clear distinction between objections
stricto sensu, which need to be raised by the party or otherwise they would be
declared as inadmissible, and objections lato sensu which can be also raised by
the Court by its own motion.17 This has an important consequence.
14 See Court of Cassation (plenary session), 4 September 2012, n 14828 (2013) I Foro italiano 1238
and within the ECJ case law see European Court of Justice, 27 June 2000, case 240/98 Océano
Grupo Editorial SA v RocióMurciano Quintero [2000], ECR 2000 I-04941; European Court of Justice,
6 October 2009, case-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira
[2009], ECR 2009 I-09579; M. Ebers, ‘ECJ (First Chamber) 6 October 2009, Case C-40/08, Asturcom
Telecomunicaciones SL v. Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira – From Océano to Asturcom: Mandatory
Consumer Law, Ex Officio Application of European Union Law and Res Judicata’ 18 European
Review of Private Law (2010) 823–846.
15 Court of Cassation (plenary session), 7 September 2012, n 14828 ibid, ruling on the possibility
of the Court to assess of its ownmotion the legal acts.
16 Court of Cassation (plenary session), 7 May 2013, n 10531 ibid.
17 Court of Cassation, ruling, 27 June 2014, n 14688, which referred the case to the First President
for the eventual assignment to the plenary session in connection with a claim of a petition ‘on the
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‘The system of objections is changing contract law’,18 providing the Court
with the opportunity to automatically affect parties’ autonomy in the light of the
need to issue ‘a fair judgment’, thereby going beyond a rigid formalistic judgment
anchored to the parties’ claims. This is because the fair judgment standard
‘operates as an assessment criterion’ and puts into practice ‘the obligation of the
Judge to disclose all procedurally relevant facts for his decision, hearing both
parties’.19 Also in this case, the reference to fairness is not alien to positive law;
rather, it implies its correct implementation through a careful interpretation of
procedural principles. This has been confirmed by a very recent Court of Cassation
(plenary session) ruling which can be seen as a real manifesto on this issue.20
This is a well-known issue. In the past,21 Courts held that the possibility of
raising by their own motion the voidness of the contract was required in the event
of claims based on ‘the performance or termination of the contract, but not with
respect to other genetic defects’, like claims for cancellation or rescission of the
contract. There followed the interim order (27 November 2012) and the decision
aimed at dealing, in all its aspects, with ‘the problem of the relationship between
raising ex officio contractual voidness and contractual claims, in order to reach a
possible organic solution as a whole’ that concerns both contractual voidness and
the boundaries of the scope of judicial trials, both of which are key principles of
the Court’s control over contracts.
It is obvious that this decision has a considerable impact on many substan-
tive rules22 involving the Court’s power to hold a contract void of its own motion;
question of the Court’s right to automatically hold declare of its own motion the ineffectiveness of
a contract entered into by a falsus procurator, in the light of the opportunity of reviewing the
traditional approach which configures views such issue as an objection stricto sensu of the
“pseudo-represented party”’.
18 S. Pagliantini, ‘L’eccezione di inefficacia ex art 1398 nella fattispecie complessa della falsa
rappresentanza’ Rivista di diritto civile 6 (2014) 1429 et seq.
19 S. Pagliantini, ‘La condizione di erede beneficiato come eccezione rilevabile di ufficio: l’opi-
nione del civilista’ Persona e Mercato 2013, 300; on this point, see also R. Oriani, ‘Eccezione in
senso lato e onere d tempestiva allegazione: un discorso chiuso?’ IForo italiano 2013, 3515et seq;
A. Proto Pisani,Lezioni di diritto processuale civile (Naples: Jovene, 2014) 203 et seq and F. Cipria-
ni, ‘Il processo civile nello Stato democratico’, in V. Garofoli (ed), L’unità del sapere giuridico tra
diritto penale e processo (Milan: Giuffré, 2005) 109 et seq.
20 Court of Cassation (plenary session), 12 December 2014, n 26242; and Civil Court of Cassation
(plenary session), 12 December 2014, n 26243; Pres Rovelli, Draftsman, ‘Travaglino’ (2015) Giur-
isprudenza italiana 70.
21 Court of Cassation (plenary session), 4 September 2012, n 14828 (2013) I Foro italiano 1253.
22 From the interplay with other appeals and special types of protecting voidness to the different
forms of regularization of an invalid contract, from the resolution of the contract to the conversion
of the void contract.
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this holding is different from a mere declaration of voidness and from the
following ruling’s suitability to become res judicata. In other words, the theme
pertains to the relationship between substantial law and the trial and, in particu-
lar, between the contract and the trial.
There follows the key functional delimitation of voidness and of the scope of
trial. Both of these are affected by the attention paid to claims for substantive
justice.
Voidness has been brought back, against dispersive trends, to a unitary form
of protection of supra-individual general interests through a judgment of disva-
lue. This applies both to cases of non-compliance with mandatory rules as well
cases of non-compliance with the principles of public order and morality. It
applies also to cases of structural illegality, given the public interest for a ‘correct,
ordered and reasonable’ exercise of private autonomy. It additionally applies to
cases of special voidness which express a general interest in securing a contrac-
tual balance and which, in turn, epitomizes a protective public order going
beyond any distinction between a party’s claim and an ex officio ruling of
voidness. On this point, we need to make an important distinction that pervades
the Court’s reasoning. The ex officio assessment of the voidness issue is neces-
sary – as it has been held by the ECJ23 – and this must be distinguished from the
declaration of voidness, which meets other needs and limits. This leads to a first
conclusion. Bringing the different cases of voidness within the scope of a func-
tional unit allows for the reaffirmation of the need to view the Court’s mandatory
and ex officio assessment of voidness as an indispensable guarantee of effective
protection of fundamental values within social structures.24 In addition, the scope
of a judgment brings to light the functional values expressly recognized as the
basic guide for juridical reasoning. The list is detailed and analytical: The sub-
stantial equivalence between law and trial; The stability of judicial decisions that
eliminate tortuous steps and paths, thereby giving a final response to demands
for justice; The harmonisation of the decision in order to avoid the breakdown of
the unity of the substantial situation; The concentration of decisions; The effec-
tive protection against ‘any formalistic interpretation that is unnecessarily tedious
in relation to the time required for a judgment’; The principle of a fair trial
pursuant to Article 111 of the Italian Constitution and Article 6 ECHR; Respect for
23 European Court of Justice, 4 June 2009, case 243/08 Pannon.
24 See also 12 December 2014, n 26242, ibid, point 3 from 1 to 15, ‘the ratio of such establishment
assessment is not that to eliminate, in all cases, the void contract from the scope of what is
relevant in according to juridical terms; rather, it is to prevent that the contract may constitute this
is the basis of for a jurisdictional judicial decision which somehow postulates allow for its validity
or provisional ability to produce legal effects’.
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the non-unlimited justice-resource, in addition to the principles of procedural
loyalty and honesty and of formal equality of the parties.
Principles and values, which ultimately direct everyone to a result of the
scope of a trial. The definitive consolidation of the substantial situation, which is
directly or indirectly raised before the Court, leading to a decision characterized
by ‘stability, certainty, reliability over time, combined with the system values of
celerity and justice’. Also in this case, the conclusion is accurate and convincing.
Going beyond its private or public law nature, the Court’s judgment cannot but be
affected by its functional dimension, which is that ‘to attract within its scope …
the situation of a subjective right … evaluated in its entirety, ie in relation to its
total and actual substantial extent’. This has a clear consequence in the context of
contractual claims. ‘The judgment encompasses the contract in its dual nature of
historical fact and programmatic situation as well as (with it) the legal-substantial
relationship arising out of it’. This implies for the Court a duty to ‘assess a possible
ground for the voidness of a contract and to disclose it to the parties, throughout
the trial, up to its conclusion’. A different matter is the declaration of voidness,
which may not be mandatory, and the objective limits of the judgment. Lastly, the
decalogue for the judge (7.1) is very clear, oriented by a conception of trials which
is not ‘excessively publicistic’ but is rather guided by the value of fair judg-
ments.
Reference is thus made again to the principles and values used in legal
reasoning.25 We thus need to examine these in detail, taking into account all the
concerns and different opinions provided by scholars who have criticised Courts
for an excessive deviation26 or an improper generalization or27 for the risks of
adopting a reasoning that skips the necessary medium of a rule.28
25 S. Pagliantini, “Rilevabilià officiosa e risolubilità degli effetti: la doppia motivazione della
Cassazione ... a mo’ di bussola per rivedere Itaca”. I Contratti 11 (2012) 874 et seq. See S. Paglianti-
ni, ‘Rilevabilità officiosa e risolubilità degli effetti: la doppia motivazione della Cassazione .a mò
di bussola per rivedere Itaca’ I Contratti 1 (2011) 113.
26 F. Busnelli, ‘Verso una giurisprudenza che si fa dottrina. Considerazioni in margine al revire-
ment della Cassazione sul danno da c.d. “nascita malformata”’ Rivista di diritto civile 2013, 1527
and 1529.
27 V. Roppo, ‘Causa concreta: una storia di successo? Dialogo (non compiacente, né reticente)
con la giurisprudenza di legittimità e di merito’ Rivista di diritto civile 2013, 957; R. Pardolesi, ‘Un
nuovo super-potere giudiziario: la buona fede adeguatrice e demolitoria’ (2014) I Foro italiano
2041.
28 U. Breccia, ‘Che cosa è “giusto” nella prospettiva del diritto privato?’, now in U. Breccia,
Immagini del diritto privato, I, Teoria generale, fonti, diritti. Scritti (Turin: Giappichelli, 2013) 288.
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3 Contractual justice and the interplay between
facts and values
With the publication of the book by John Rawls in 1971, the debate on justice
received a new impulse and became a central theme in the public dimension of
Western countries.29 The underlying theory is well-known.
For a correct assessment of the conditions of a just society, Rawls uses ‘the
expedient of identifying the conditions which would be agreed on by parties
acting under a veil of ignorance or lacking any information on the situation they
will find themselves in once the agreement has been reached’. This is because
ignorance fosters impartiality. This approach conveys the idea of justice as
fairness, namely a cooperative activity supported by rules which Rawls draws
from the most advanced results of social sciences, from moral philosophy to
economics, and with game theory, rational choice theory, and theories of the
needs of the Welfare State. His work, as is well known, led to a rebirth of
political philosophy ‘which resumed the central role it had ever had since Plato
and Aristotle’.30
However, his underlying assumptions, which are the result of an enlightened
liberalism, have been much debated. Criticisms concerned the equality principle,
which has been perceived as a too fragile and formal concept, but most criticisms
were principally directed toward the method intended to create a unitary and
abstract model, in line with a certain philosophical tradition (Hobbes, Rousseau,
Kant). Some influential authors31 have criticized such constructivism and have
followed another line of thought (from Condorcet to Bentham and Marx). The idea
is that there is no institution or procedure capable of identifying a just social
arrangement.
Contractual justice only evokes a balance within the content of a contract.
Specifically on this point, for a number of reasons, legal scholars have always
criticised the concept of a unitary idea.32
29 S. Grundmann, H.-W. Micklitz and M. Renner, Privatrechtstheorie (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck,
2015) and forthcoming in English (2016).
30 M. Ricciardi, L’ideale di giustizia. Da John Rawls a oggi (Geneva: EGEA, 2010) VII et seq.
31 A. Sen, The Idea of Justice (London: Penguin, 2009).
32 See H. Collins and with the Social Justice Group, ‘Social Justice in European Contract Law: A
Manifesto’ (rapporteur with the Social Justice Group), 10 European Law Journal 653 (2004); and,
on this point, for a comprehensive overview see H.-W. Micklitz (ed), The Many Concepts of Social
Justice in European Private Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011); V. Scalisi, ‘Giustizia
contrattuale e rimedi: fondamento e limiti di un controverso principio’, in V. Scalisi, Il contratto in
trasformazione (Milan: Guiffré, 2011) 337 et seq; G. Vettori, ‘Giustizia e rimedi nel diritto europeo
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The legislator has intervened in many fields in order to correct imbalances.
Starting from the observation of this progressive legislative attention to the
inequality of power between parties, scholars have begun dealing again with the
Courts’ control over contracts. Italian and European scholars have long debated
this issue, outlining different options as to how this tension should be under-
stood.33 The reconstructions are clear and rigorous.34 I wish to emphasize only one
point.35 The impression is that the arguments for protection are analyzed and
reduced to the forms of the weak contractor and of the asymmetries of power.
These arguments do not completely achieve their ambition. Justice cannot be
claimed in the trials and in the contract for the protection of a particular party’s
interest; rather, only as an expression of a general interest and of a constitutional
principle regulating, precisely, both the contract and the trial. Yet, the general
interest cannot be solely an abstract principle.
Millenary wisdom, fixed in time by the 20th century Masters, shows us the
right approach. Men can deal with absolute ideas, such as justice, only as from
the time of their existence, from the time of their being. We are stuck in our time
and existence which contains and establishes our need for justice. To understand
it and correctly act, we need to start from concrete experiences of negation. Thus,
once again, we need to commence from a particular time, though with one
clarification.
Contemporaneousness does not mean full harmony with the present. It calls
for much more: a non-coincidence. ‘A unique relationship with one’s own times,
which adheres thereto but takes a distance therefrom’36 to perceive their lights
and shadows. So we need to reflect on today, its limits and on what extends
beyond.
dei contratti’ Europa e diritto privato 2001 and now in G. Vettori, Diritto privato e ordinamento
comunitario (Milan: Giuffré, 2009) 224 et seq.
33 See Scalisi, n 32 above, 337 et seq.
34 For a survey see E. Navarretta, ‘L’evoluzione dell’autonomia contrattuale fra ideologie e
principi’ Quaderni fiorentini XLIII, 2014, 646. With reference to European contract law see
S. Grundmann, ‘Information, party autonomy and economic agents in european contract law’
CommonMarket Law Review 39, 269–293 (2002).
35 All this leads to the conclusion that the autonomy of private parties is not declining; rather, it
can be an instrument and factor for the transformation of institutions in its ability to direct
political and economic decisions of the time, see U. Breccia, ‘Autonomia contrattuale, Dei contra-
tti in generale’ in E. Navarretta and A. Orestano (eds), E. Gabbrielli (dir), Commentario del codice
civile (Turin: UTET, 2011) 67.
36 G. Agamben, Che cos’è il contemporaneo? (Rome: Nottetempo, 2008) 9 et seq.
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We are still immersed in a difficult context which escapes definitions.37 We
live in an era that has been overwhelmed by technological and scientific ad-
vances, often lacking political and cultural bearings. It is an era that has learned
to live with the crisis of the economy, of ideologies and militancy, with the
triumph of neoliberalism and its profound deficiencies.
The last decade of the 20th century began with the announcement of the end
of history, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and pushed its shadow into the present,
even if dispersed in a magma with no name, yet with defined anthropological
segments. Between the two centuries and the two millennia, collective claims
progressively died down and full dignity was given to ‘being yourself’ (one’s
selfishness), as a program of life and as a final goal exalted by reality shows,
social networks and visual arts.38
However, after the momentous events of the end of the century, the decline of
post-modernity is evident, emerging from any science and artistic perception.
Philosophy goes beyond nihilism and content indifference to rely on a
realism that is attentive to the changes and consolidations of the present.39 The
jurist is less and less satisfied with his allegiance to language and procedures. The
jurist looks for the partial truth of his time, capable of directing and determining
the work of the interpreter, increasingly influenced by an objectivity that is linked
to a concrete dimension of the present and of the existence.40 Literature and
visual arts anticipate the future, as so often happens.
The former abandons the influences of post-modernism to go back, immer-
sing itself in the concreteness of historical and social context. The reason for this
is clear. ‘In an age of material contradictions like the present one, with its
political and economic urgencies, the idea that there exists only a language has
been questioned: the time of lightness, of cheerful nihilism no longer makes
sense. We assist in a return of the themes of neo-realism which had other roots;
yet a new realism and a new modernism resulting from early 20th century
37 From 1980s neoliberalism to the rising of European principles. From the centrality of competi-
tion to the constitutionalisation of personal values and of a social market economy. From the legal
effectiveness of the Charter of Nice-Strasbourg to the Fiscal Compact that weighs heavily on the
content and the guarantee of the subjective situations of private parties.
38 This is summarized in the representation of the unmade and dirty bed of Tracy Erminn,
exhibited for the first time in 1999 and recently sold for over twomillion euros by Christie’s. In that
symbol of an era there lies an intimate piece of the author’s life as a fragment of subjectivity that
binds things and feelings, without any claim of objectivity since attention is given, as a trait of the
time, to ‘emotions, what is genuine and not artificial’.
39 In particular, M. Ferraris,Manifesto del neorealismo (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2012).
40 See the bright and enlightening essays by G. Benedetti, L’oggettività esistenziale dell’interpre-
tazione (Turin: Giappicchelli, 2014).
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Europe41’. After post-modernism, focus on the narrative, crime and noir, the
transition to a new era (of hyper-modernism) has deeply different traits. Despite
the diversity of inspirations, ‘the method is always giving voice to reality and
experience’, to the material world with its emotions and traumas, where good
and evil return to be perceived and isolated as such.42
Contemporary art, in its best expressions, tells and explains present dramas
with an emotional and engaging language. From the roots of the current econom-
ic crisis to the shattering of intermediate communities, such as the family, it
always focuses its attention on the concrete reality of an ever-changing world.43
In this crushed social reality, the same forms of political democracy continu-
ously fluctuate within an unstable balance between representation and participa-
tion. We talk about ‘live’ democracy,44 ‘individual hegemonies’ or ‘hybrid and
personal democracy’, dominated by TV and Internet.45 This is a phenomenon that
has deep roots, not only in Italy.46
What happens to the sources of private law is rather clear. We are progres-
sively shifting from a system of rules and structures requiring conformity, to a
scenario where priority is given to internal constitutional principles and commu-
nity principles. Norms, which often lack a situation required by law and which do
not allow for a judgment of conformity to a given rule, require instead the balan-
cing of different values. The axis of legalism moves from the absolutism of law to
the centrality of the interpreter.What ismore, law ismore andmorewritten and re-
written by different subjects: legislators, judges, Authorities, scholars, private
persons. This has many merits though it also implies a serious risk, namely the
erosion of a value of civilization: the certainty of law. What should we do?
From this division springs a thoughtful reflection on how to apply rights,
principles and general clauses. The bases of this reflection are legal sources
diversifying the subjective positions of private persons and inducing us to per-
41 R. Luperini, Tramonto e resistenza della critica, (Macerata: Quodlibet, 2014).
42 Luperini, n 41 above, and P. Di Stefano, ‘Addio al postmoderno, la narrativa è realistica’ Il
Corriere della sera 20 August 2014.
43 The activity performed in Florence by the Centre for Contemporary Culture Strozzina in
Palazzo Strozzi, is very significant. The exhibition on the ‘American Dream’ showed how the
housing bubble caused the global recession, just like the recent exhibition ‘Family matters’ told,
in the most convincing way, about the hyper-modern reality of family collectivity. See on this
point C. Saraceno, Coppie e famiglie. Non è questione di natura (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2012); P. Gins-
borg, Famiglia novecento (Turin: Einaudi, 2013).
44 N. Urbinati,Democrazia in diretta (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2013).
45 I. Diamanti,Democrazia ibrida (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2014).
46 Kennedy, n 3 above; D. Kennedy and M. Chantal, ‘Europe-building through private law:
lesson from constitutional theory’ (2012) European Review of Contract Law 326 et seq.
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ceive the differences and the originating source of inequality. This is made
possible by a new and rigorous argumentative technique.47
The theme of contract justice lies precisely here.
4 Fair trial and the right to an effective remedy in
the European Courts system
As it has been observed, we need to distinguish two complementary yet not
coincidental issues within both internal and EU sources. On the one hand, the
right to an effective action requires the ‘ability to take action’ through effective
judicial protection, that is, a protection deprived of any anomaly or preclusion
that empties the substantial situation (Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (1948), Article 6 ECHR, Article 47 CFREU). On the other hand, the
right to an effective remedy, allowing the individual to obtain in Court all the
benefits granted by the protected interest48 (Article 24 of the Constitution, Articles
6 and 13 ECHR, Article 47 CFREU).
The first issue involves a guarantee of the minimum conditions of the effec-
tiveness of a trial: a trial should take place within a reasonable period of time, it
should be conducted by an independent and impartial tribunal, both parties
should be heard and ensured the right of defence.49 The second issue calls for a
reflection and an adjustment of the forms of protection: protection should guar-
47 M. Kumm, ‘Who is afraid of the total constitution? Constitutional rights and principle and the
constitutionalization of private law’German Law Journal 2006, 341–370.
48 S. Caporusso, ‘Effettività e ragionevolezza della tutela giurisdizionale nel canone dell’art 6,
par 1, CEDU’ Persona e Mercato 2014, 118 et seq; N. Trocker, ‘Il diritto processuale europeo e le
“tecniche” della sua formazione: l’opera della Corte di Giustizia’ Europa e diritto privato 2010, 361
et seq; N. Trocker, La formazione del diritto processuale europeo (Turin: Giappichelli, 2011) 171 et
seq; L.P. Comoglio, ‘Giurisdizione e processo nel quadro delle garanzie costituzionali’ Rivista
trimestrale diritto processuale civile 1994, 1070 et seq; L.P. Comoglio, ‘Il “giusto processo” civile
nella dimensione comparatista’ Rivista di diritto processuale 2002, 728 et seq and D. Dalfino,
‘Accesso alla giustizia, principio di effettività e adeguatezza della tutela giurisdizionale’ Rivista
trimestrale diritto processuale civile 2014 (3) 907 et seq; N. Półtorak, European Union Rights in
National Courts (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, The Netherlands, 2015) especially 39–100;
C. Mak, ‘Rights an Remedies’, in H.-W. Micklitz (ed), Constitutionalization of European Private Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 236–259; N. Reich, ‘The Principle of Effectiveness and EU
Private Law’, in U. Bernitz, X. Groussot and F. Schulyox (eds), General Principles of EU Law And
European Private Law (The Hague:Wolter Kluwer, 2013) 301–326.
49 For a bright and deep synthesis, see Caporusso, n 48 above, ibid. For a review of the case-law
of the ECHR, see F. Edel, ‘The Length of Civil and Criminal Proceedings in the Case-law of the
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antee in Court the full satisfaction of every protected right and interest.50 We now
need to further ponder on the latter principle because of the delicate and topical
nature of this issue, which concerns us closely.
Suffice it to think that – as a result of the work of scholars and of the Courts –
effectiveness has been extended to protect not only the access mode to and course
of the trial, but also the potentialities of the situations to be fully satisfied. This
further extension is obtained by removing all substantive and procedural hin-
drances.51 In this way, the right to an effective action has been progressively
construed as ‘the right to an effective remedy’.52 This implies that a just trial (Article
111 of the Italian Constitution) and a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR and Article 47
CFREU) cannot be separated from substantive protections. Substantive and pro-
cedural protections need to be reviewed together, balancing interests and values
because ‘just and fair … are qualifications that cannot exhaust themselves by
referring to the principle of legality; rather, they recall … the system of values
underlying the rules’.53
In essence, the principle of effective judicial protection developed by Eur-
opean Courts requires identifying and reconstructing the most adequate protec-
tion of the substantive interest.54 This includes the possibility of choosing reme-
dies and of their accumulation, provided specific circumstances are met.55 And
the reason why this is needed is clear.
The right of access to a Court enshrined in Article 24 of the Italian Constitu-
tion needs to be coordinated with Articles 2, 3 and 4. These provisions require the
identification of a concrete and differentiated content for the protection of the
European Court of Human Rights’, Council of Europe Publishing, available at http://www.echr.co
e.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-EN-HRFILES-16(2007).pdf.
50 On the instrumental nature of trial, A. Proto Pisani, ‘Appunti preliminari sui rapporti tra diritto
sostanziale e processuale’, in La tutela giurisdizionale dei diritti (Naples, 2003) 1 et seq.
51 N. Trocker, ‘Dal giusto processo all’effettività dei rimedi: l’‘azione’ nell’elaborazione della
Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo’ Rivista trimestrale diritto processuale civile 2007, 35 et seq.
P. Biavati, Europa e processo civile. Metodi e prospettive (Turin: Giappichelli, 2003) 62. As a
significant precedent, see M. Cappelletti, ‘Accesso alla giustizia come programma di riforma e
comemetodo di pensiero’ Rivista di diritto processuale 1982, 233 et seq.
52 Dalfino, n 48 above, 917 and his reference to ECJ case law, 15 May 1986, case 222/84, Johnston;
19 June 1990, case 213/89 House of Lords, especially Point 21, (1992) IV Foro italiano, c 498; 25 July
2002, case 50/00 and EU Tribunal, sec II, 3 March 2011, n 110–07.
53 Dalfino, n 48 above, 918.
54 N. Trocker, ‘La Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea ed il processo civile’, in
Trocker (2011), n 48 above, 107, 126 et seq and V. Varano, entry Remedies, Digesto discipline
privatistiche, sezione civile XVI, Turin, 1997, 571 et seq.
55 Dalfino, n 48 above, 927 who mentions Articles 1218, 2058, 1453, 2740 Italian Civil Code and
185 Italian Criminal Code.
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right to access to a Court that cannot be satisfied by the twin concepts of specific
protection and protection by way of equivalent measures. This is precisely
because a trial should give ‘the right-holder everything that and exactly what he
is entitled to obtain’.56
It remains to be precisely spelled out how the right to an effective remedy
must be reconstructed and implemented.
In the past, the Italian Constitutional Court did not give a clear interpretation
of Article 24 of the Constitution, so that it was difficult to identify ‘the actual scope
of the constitutional coverage, to establish whether it concerned only the right to
a “fair trial” … or “also the right to an effective [substantive] protection”’.57 Yet,
the Court has recently and clearly affirmed its approach. The occasion was the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of international rules on State immunity58
against an action for damages.
In ruling on this matter, the Court established an inseparable link between
the right to take action (Article 24 of the Constitution) and personal inviolable
rights. What is more, the former article was qualified as one of ‘the greatest
principles of juridical civilization’; the Court also established the existence of an
effective dimension of inviolable rights manifesting itself ‘in effective protection
… via the Courts’.59 To clarify the meaning of such effective protection, there are
two starting points: the concept of a legally protected interest, which is the core of
subjective rights;60 the meaning of the effectiveness of protection.61
Let us discuss the first starting point.
The protection of an interest has to open ‘all the paths for legal protection, in
accordance with the universal criterion of adapting effects to the substance of the
interests expressed by the legal fact’.62 The Court of Cassation has insisted on this
point, opening up the way for the compensability of, most notably and among
others, legitimate interests. This conclusion can be reached by a correct character-
ization of legal relevance and of remedies. On the first aspect, it is well-known
that the juridical essence of a fact – that is, its relevance for law – must be kept
56 G. Chiovenda, Principi di diritto processuale civile (Naples: Jovene, 1980) 81.
57 I. Pagni, Tutela specifica e tutela per equivalente (Milan: Giuffré, 2004) 56.
58 See Constitutional Court n 238/2014 and, on this point, D. Imbruglia, ‘L’azione di risarcimento
per fatti illeciti degli Stati e il principio di effettività della tutela giurisdizionale. Notes on the
Court’s sentence n 238/2014’ Persona eMercato 2014, 163 et seq.
59 Imbruglia, n 58 above.
60 A. Falzea, ‘Gli interessi legittimi e le situazioni giuridiche soggettive’ Rivista di diritto civile
2000, 683 et seq, but also the very famous Court of Cassation, 22 July 1999, ruling n 500/1999
(1999) I Foro italiano 3201.
61 Comoglio (1994), n 48 above, 1076 et seq. Quoted by Pagni, n 57 above, 57.
62 Pagni, n 57 above, 59.
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separate from effectiveness. The different conceptual reconstructions put forward
do not change this conclusion.63 The juridical essence guides and defines the
substantive protection of a subjective situation.
We need to start afresh precisely from here by coordinating such essence with
a new context of sources.
Suffice it to recall that, more than ten years ago, attention was given to the
features of diffused normativity, as the prelude for the advance of law by princi-
ples.64 This has a clear consequence: ‘The traditional system of legal sources “is
nebulised” and the interpreter must deal with a widespread normativity, which
calls for the integration of facts and principles having’ the traits of normativity
and for the need to confront ‘the experience, the practice, the interests at stake’.
This is for an obvious reason. Only then can the process ‘unveil the social
foundations of positive law’ and, ‘in certain respects, contribute to connect
validity with effectiveness’.65
The notion of effectiveness confirms this conclusion.66
This principle, at this stage of the legal order, is at the basis of the conversion
process of facts into law, as shown by a series of objective data.67
The radical change in the system of legal sources progressively gives it a
positive value while at the same time changing legal dynamics. This is proven by
(in addition to the rules enshrined in the Italian Constitution and in European
texts) the rule contained at the beginning of the Italian Code of Administrative
Justice, where reference is made to a jurisdiction which should ensure ‘full and
effective protection according to the principles of the Constitution and of Eur-
opean law’.
Further confirmation has been given by recent Constitutional Court rulings
where Articles 2 and 24 have been systemically construed, as said above, to
ensure the effective protection of not only the right to bring an action but also to
63 For a synthesis on this point, see G. Vettori, Contratto e rimedi (Padua: Cedam, 2009) 378. And
the reference to A.E. Cammarata, Formalismo e sapere giuridico: studi (Milan: Capelli, 1963) and
especially ‘Il significato e la funzione del “fatto” nell’esperienza giuridica’ 245 et seq.
64 G. Berti, ‘Diffusione della normatività e nuovo disordine delle fonti del diritto’ Rivista diritto
privato 2003, 460 et seq. See also P. Grossi, Introduzione al Novecento giuridico (Rome-Bari:
Laterza, 2012); G. Silvestri, Dal potere ai principi. Libertà ed eguaglianza nel costituzionalismo
contemporaneo (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2009).
65 Berti, n 64 above, 462–464.
66 See G. Vettori, ‘Controllo giudiziale sul contratto ed effettività delle tutele. Una premessa’
Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate 2015, 151 et seq.
67 P. Piovani, entry Effettività (Principio di), in Enciclopedia del diritto (Milan: Giuffré, 1965) 421
et seq.
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substantive remedies. This should be achieved with a flexibility … that is typical
of common law remedies68 on the basis of provisions (Articles 2 and 24 Constitu-
tion, Articles 6 and 13 ECHR and Article 47 CFREU)69 calling for the enforcement,
in Europe, of the expectation of an effective remedy, intended as the claim for
appropriate instruments of protection and suitable procedural configurations
ensuring the full satisfaction of the protected interest70 and reducing71 “the
distance gap between the means of protection and the interest or good that needs
to be protected”.72
We can thus understand how the principle of effectiveness is becoming a key
rule of the constitutional system,73 both domestic and European.74 Around this
pivot, rotate both the dynamics of protection of private persons75 and the con-
68 Comoglio (1994), n 48 above, 1076.
69 On this point, see the nice essay by N. Trocker, ‘L’art 47 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali
dell’Unione Europea e l’evoluzione dell’ordinamento comunitario in materia di tutela giurisdizio-
nale dei diritti’, in G. Vettori (ed), Carta Europea e diritti dei privati (Padua: Cedam, 2002) 381 et
seq, And especially Pagni, n 57 above, 54 et seq.
70 U. Mattei, ‘I Rimedi, in Il diritto soggettivo’, in R. Sacco (ed),Trattato di diritto civile (Turin:
UTET, 2001) 105 et seq; A. Di Majo, ‘Il linguaggio dei rimedi’ Europa e diritto privato 2005, 341 et
seq; A. Di Majo, ‘Adempimento e risarcimento nella prospettiva dei rimedi’ Europa e diritto privato
2007, 2 et seq; D. Messinetti, ‘Sapere complesso e tecniche rimediali’ Europa e diritto privato 2005,
605 et seq; P.G. Monateri, Ripensare il diritto civile (Turin, 2006). For a review of the CJEU case-law
on National remedies, see M. Dougan, National Remedies Before the Court of Justice: Issues of
Harmonisation and Differentiation (Portland: Hart, 2004) 227 et seq.
71 A. Di Majo, La tutela civile dei diritti (4th ed, Milan: Giuffré, 2003) 13 et seq; Di Majo (2005),
n 70 above, 342 et seq.
72 DiMajo (2005), n 70 above, 355.
73 ECHR 31 May 2011, Maggio ed altri v. Italia, (2011) Foro italiano, entry Diritti politici e civili,
n 177; Constitutional Court, 28 November 2012, n 264 (2013) I Foro italiano, with notes by R. Rom-
boli and G. Amoroso, and ibid, 788 with a note by E. Scoditti, ‘Se un diritto umano diventa diritto
fondamentale: la CEDU come parametro interposto di costituzionalità’, and by M. De Luca,
‘Quanto incide l’allargamento dei controlimiti sulla efficacia delle norme CEDU’; Court of Justice,
Grand Chamber, 26 February 2013, case 399/11 Melloni-Ministero Fiscal; on this ruling, see the
comment by A. Ruggeri, ‘La Corte di Giustizia, il primato incondizionato del diritto dell’Unione e
il suo mancato bilanciamento col valore della salvaguardia dei principi di struttura degli ordina-
menti nazionali nel loro fare “sistema”’, in www.diritticomparati.it; R. Conti, ‘Mandato di arresto
europeo ed esecuzione di una pena irrigata in absentia’ Corriere Giuridico 4/2013, 8; R. Conti, ‘Da
giudice (nazionale) a Giudice (eurocomunitario). A cuore aperto dopo il casoMelloni’, in www.eur
opeanrights.eu.
74 European case law is very extensive; see the recent ECJ, 30 September 2003, case 224/01,
point 58; ECJ, 12 December 2006, case 446/04, points 203 and 219; ECJ, 17 April 2007, case 470/
03, point 123; ECJ, 23 April 2008, case 201/05.
75 G. Vettori, ‘Validità, responsabilità e cumulo dei rimedi. On the case Cir-Fininvest’ Persona e
Mercato 2013, 279, in www.personaemercato.it.
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creteness of remedies that are, – precisely – effective.76 Therefore, the definition
of effective protection mechanisms is a primary instrument of this new integrated
order, governed by principles and values. We need to further ponder on this
issue.
5 The new techniques of legal reasoning
Scholars have already warned us that to argue on the basis of principles means to
overcome the analogical or typological method itself,77 which is the way in which
the interpreter participates nowadays in the positivization of rules and of mechan-
isms of protection. This requires us to acknowledge an objective fact.
‘Law lives on rules and consolidated precedents, law-makers and Courts, all
called to balance interests, to interpret rules within the framework of principles,
to disapply National laws in order to implement Community sources’. So much so
that rules are written and re-written by different players, ‘among which it is often
difficult to determine who commands and who obeys’.78 Therefore, unless we
want to undermine the value of certainty, we need to engage – in a new and
difficult way – in the creation of a new system tailored to present times. This
requires at least two immediate tasks. On the one hand, rethinking rights, private
autonomy, the controls for giving them fullness and effectiveness in a general
context that has profoundly changed; on the other hand, examining how their
regulation can help to contain and overcome the effects of the crisis in order to
define the new contours of a regulation of private relationships in tune with the
times.79 From the above stems the role of the interpreter as a protagonist in the
76 P. Grossi, ‘Diritto canonico e cultura giuridica’ Quaderni fiorentini 3 (2003) 380–381: ‘the
particular/universal dialectic is very strong in canon law and the value given to particulars is
considerable: the sin cannot but be the single sin of the single individual and law cannot but be
the efficient remedy intended to prevent, alleviate, penalize that specific sin’.
77 A book onmortgages has recently inspired a refined and erudite dialogue on how to adapt the
conservatism of some traditional sets of rules which, while are essential for legal dynamics, yet
are governed in a manner that is nowadays inappropriate, causing uncertainties and discontent
whenever the legal discourse ‘appears somehow unsatisfying and calls for a critical review’. See
Baralis and Spada, ‘Dialogando su dogmatica giuridica e giurisprudenza (dopo aver letto un libro
sull’ipoteca)’Rivista diritto privato 2013, 1 et seq and, on this point, Vettori, n 66 above, 151 et seq.
For a theoretical discussion, see R. Alexy, ‘Two or Three?’, in M. Borowski (ed), On the Nature of
Legal Principles (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2010) 9–18.
78 A. Punzi, Prefazione al volume di Benedetti, n 40 above, XV et seq.
79 M. Fioravanti, ‘Cultura costituzionale e trasformazioni economico-sociali: l’esperienza del
novecento’, in R. Bifulco and O. Roselli, Crisi economica e trasformazioni della dimensione giuridi-
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search for the hard core of law we are called upon to apply every day. A law in
which the rule should be the objective response to expectations of justice, without
falling from above; rather, it is an ‘invention of reason and of the wise artfulness
of the best argument’,80 built into the density of the Court’s opinion. In short, if
the careful search for sources grounding the decision satisfies the need for
objectivity, the subjectivity of the interpreter (confined in his being here and now)
requires prudence and enlightenment, that is, knowledge and wisdom. Only in
this way his decision will be credible and the precedent will be passed on.
Luigi Mengoni has clearly indicated the terms of this new task of the jurist.
‘The moral principles enshrined in the Constitution in the shape of fundamental
rights … acquire legal nature … without losing their original status. They belong
at the same time to law and ethics’ but they are subject to ‘the manners, proce-
dures and constraints of legal argumentation’.81
Thesenewways, procedures and constraints concernessentially three aspects:
the relationship between facts andvalues, the contemporarymeaningof a systemic
method, the dialogue between legal science and judicial practice for the creation of
a true ‘doctrine of the judicial precedent’82 in that new ‘case-by-case approach’ that
is typical of legal argumentation. We will now briefly discuss all these aspects.
a) The relationship between facts and values
‘The long-standing battle conducted by legal positivism to expel the idea of
justice from any theoretical thinking of law is grounded in the dualism between
factual judgements and value judgements. Justice is believed to be a value
judgement expressing a subjective vision which, as such, is neither useful nor
usable. But this prohibition to discuss issues of justice is based on the misconcep-
tion that all value judgements always lack a rational foundation. This belief is
ca (Turin: Giappichelli, 2013) 13 et seq. H.-W. Micklitz and D. Patterson, ‘From the Nation State to
the market : the evolution of EU private law as regulation of the economy beyond the boundaries
of the Union?’, in B. Van Vooren, S. Blockmand and J. Wouters (eds),The EU’s Role in Global
Governance: the Legal Dimension (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 59–80.
80 Benedetti, n 40 above, 33 et seq, 69 et seq,103 et seq, 223 et seq, 241 et seq.
81 L. Mengoni, Diritto e tecnica (Rome-Bari, 2001); now in C. Castronovo, A. Nicolussi and
A. Albanese (eds), Luigi Mengoni, Scritti I, Metodo e teoria giuridica (Milan: Giuffré, 2011) 47. This
passage is quoted by Irti, n 3 above, La crisi …, 41. The essay ‘Diritto and Valore’ by Mengoni is
available in English in the forthcoming English edition of Grundmann, Micklitz and Renner, n 29
above.
82 L. Mengoni, ‘I principi generali del diritto e la scienza giuridica’, in Accademia Nazionale dei
Lincei,I Principi Generali del Diritto (Rome: 1992) 328.
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erroneous; it is precisely that prohibition which has no rational foundation since
it is a dogma without justification, imposed by positivism for far too long’.83
The vagueness of the concept requires us to clarify its meaning but does not
justify the prohibition. No supposed scientific objectivity can prevent us from
speaking of a type of law where interpretation and interpreters are central, the
latter being capable of arguing not only with the standard of conformity to a rule
but also via criteria of correctness, reasonableness, proportionality.84
On the one hand, it expresses the need for ‘the correctness of practical
reasoning85 … always taking account of practical experience, common good
sense …86 so that reasonable becomes a synonym for circumspection, weighing,
balancing through equilibrium, but also justice’.87 On the other hand, it has an
elusive character, that is difficult to define.88 Recent Constitutional case-law can
help us greatly in this respect.
In defining the power of the law-maker to set retroactive rules, the Court
expects that this action must be able ‘to find an adequate justification in the need
to protect principles, rights and goods of constitutional importance, which repre-
sent “imperative reasons of general interest” according to the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)’.89
What is more, retroactive provisions – the Court adds – must find ‘an adequate
83 E. Gliozzi, ‘L’opposizione dei giudizi di fatto ai giudizi di valore: critica di un dogma giusposi-
tivista’ Rivista trimestrale diritto processuale civile 3 (2014) 857 et seq, but also H. Putnam, Fatto/
valore. Fine di una dicotomia (Italian translation, Rome: Fazi editore, 2004) especially XIV, 6–7,
ibid ‘this book attempts to demonstrate that the two dichotomies “factual judgements and value
judgements” and “factual truth and analytical truth” have corrupted our thinking both in the field
of ethical reasoning and in the description of the world, preventing us from seeing how evalua-
tion and description are intermingled and interdependent’.
84 Bright and enlightening comments are made by Grossi, n 2 above. On the concept of propor-
tionality, see R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002), English translation of Theorie der Grundrechte (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1985) and
A. Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2012).
85 M. La Torre, ‘Introduzione’, in M. La Torre and A. Spadaro (eds), La ragionevolezza del diritto
(Turin: Giappichelli, 2002) 3. See also S. Bertea, ‘A Foundation for the Conception of Law as
Practical Reason’Law and Philosophy 34 (2015) 55–88.
86 A. Morrone, ‘Principio di ragionevolezza come principio architettonico del sistema’, in La
Torre and Spadaro (eds), n 85 above, 231 et seq.
87 G. Scaccia,Gli ‘strumenti’ della ragionevolezza nel giudizio costituzionale (Milan: Giuffré, 2000)
14–15. See also R. Alexy, ‘The Reasonableness of Law’, in G. Bongiovanni, G. Sartor and C. Valen-
tini (eds), Reasonableness and Law (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009) 5–16.
88 Grossi, n 2 above, ibid, where these opinions are commented upon.
89 Constitutional Court, 28 November 2012, n 264.
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justification at the level of reasonableness’ and must not conflict ‘with other
values and interests protected by the Constitution, so that no arbitrary affecting
the substantive situations put in place by the previous laws’.90 In other words, one
has to balance potential retroactivity with ‘the principle of reasonableness (which
is redundant in the prohibition to introduce unjustified disparity of treatment)’
and with the protection of legitimate expectations as a principle inherent to the
Rule of Law; the consistency and certainty of the legal ordering; the respect of the
functions constitutionally reserved to the judiciary.91
The constraints of legal argumentation. On the other side, the definition of
the manner and of the constraints of legal argumentation are within the full scope
and responsibility of legal science which, in balancing values, must circumscribe
the Courts’ discretion, positivize values and build a doctrine of precedents.92 This
should be done in a dialogue with case-law that should differ from the past.
A few decades ago, Francesco Galgano had the merit of starting a dialogue on
the rules to be applied; yet, we now need something more, something different.
‘Legal reasoning is now pursuing other paths … values do not need to be required
by law… because they are worthy in themselves and applicable wherever they are
invoked and claimed… the event is no longer confronted with a situation required
by law … rather, it is confronted with values … rules are no longer enough in
themselves; rather, they are supported by something else, something that can
somehowmake use of them… the theory of values has erased from our debate the
problem of gaps’.93
There are numerous examples of this in both domestic and Community
European law. The invitation made by the Constitutional Court to apply Article 2
of the Italian Constitution directly, for the purposes of the nullity of a contractual
clause, and together with the wide delimitation of the off-the-record relevance ex
officio applicability of this remedy, is a first example.94
Besides, the possibility of claiming bad faith in negotiations relating to a
valid contract and the tort action to protect a contractual position damaged by an
illicit conduct, extend the scope of compensation.95
90 Constitutional Court, n 432/1997, Constitutional Court, 30 January 2009, n 24/2009; Constitu-
tional Court, n 74/2008 and n 376/1995.
91 Constitutional Court, n 103/2013; n 209/2010; n 6/1994.
92 Mengoni, n 82 above, 326–328; B. Schlink, ‘Proportionality (1)’, in M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó
(eds),The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012) 719–738, especially 724.
93 Irti, n 3 above, La crisi…, 42–43. Irti, n 3 above, Calcolabilità…, 87 et seq.
94 Constitutional Court, ruling n 77/2014, see paragraph 1.
95 Vettori, n 75 above, and in Danno responsabilità 2014, ibid. H.-W. Micklitz, The Politics of
Judicial Co-operation in the EU: Sunday Trading, Equal Treatment and Good Faith (Cambridge:
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Lastly, the rulings on the effectiveness of compensation, on consumer actions
and on prescription limitation periods, induce us to re-think several sets of
rules.96
b) The techniques of Community European law
As regards Community European law and its impact on domestic law, the latest
innovations are even more significant. In seeking an effective remedy, it is very
evident that there is a tension towards a system to be built in a dialogue between
rules and judges, which is very evident. This occurs with a focus on single cases,
which can be the sole source of elements of response and general guidance. This
reveals the importance of interpretation and application techniques.
a) The inapplicability of incompatible internal rules, despite being upheld by
recent rulings, is rigorously delimited.97 A directive, even if clear, precise and
unconditional and intended to confer rights and obligations, cannot generally be
applied in a dispute between private individuals per se. On the other hand, a rule
that contains a legal norm98 containing a right or a principle (which, to produce
its effects, must be specified by domestic and Community European provisions)
cannot be invoked for non-application purposes.99
b) The reference for a preliminary ruling appears to be a widespread control
in the hands of the judge. Such a reference is not necessary for trial courts
generally and for courts of last resort when the solution is self-evident or the
problem has already been settled by the Court of Justice of the European Union.100
Cambridge University Press, 2005) 292–423 explores the use of good faith by UK and German
Courts in consumer contracts.
96 D. Imbruglia, ‘Il giudice comune e il principio di effettività della tutela giurisdizionale: note a
margine della sentenza della Corte di Cassazione n 21255’ Persona e Mercato 2014, 55; Imbruglia,
n 58 above; M. Mauro, ‘Prescrizione ed effettività nel dialogo fra Corti italiane e Corti europee’
Persona e Mercato 2014, 139; F. Della Negra, ‘Il controllo d’ufficio sul significativo squilibrio nella
giurisprudenza europea’ Persona e Mercato 2014, 71; F. Della Negra, ‘The Uncertain Development
of the Case Law on Consumer Protection in Mortgage Enforcement Proceedings: Sánchez Morcillo
and Kušionová’ CommonMarket Law Review 52 (2015) 1009–1032.
97 ECJ, 15 January 2014, case 176/12,Association demédiation sociale.
98 This limitation does not apply to State-owned companies and to exhaustive lists of compul-
sory requirements established by a Directive; see ECLI:EU:C:1990:313 (Foster case) and ECLI:EU:
C:1990:395 (Marleasing case). For an analysis, see S. Grundmann, European Company Law (Port-
land: Intersentia, 2012) 94–97.
99 ECJ, 26 February 2013, case 617/10 and 15 January 2014, ibid.
100 ECLI:EU:C:1982:335 (CILFIT I case). See the commnet by Former Justice Edward available at
http://www.hadjimichalis.gr/keimena/ccbe1/Documents/rapport%20D%20Edward.pdf.
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It must be applied in the other cases, and this requires full knowledge of Commu-
nity European law by trial Courts and especially by Cassation Courts.101
c) Conforming interpretations acquire increasing importance and accuracy.
Domestic rules are to be applied in the light of the wording and purposes of the
Directive (or of the principle) to reach an (interpretative) solution that conforms to
the objective pursued by these sources. There ensues the reconstruction of a rule
via interpretation.102
d) The ECHR control over social rights and budget limits takes on a meaning
of great guiding importance on which we need to ponder.103
What is more, the Court has recently criticized the power of the Liquidator to
cancel a preliminary contract pursuant to Article 72 bis of the Italian Bankruptcy
Law. Italian Courts, states the opinion, are entitled ‘only to examine the formal
legality of the disputed measure, without dealing with its needs and proportion-
ality in the light of the principles set out in Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the Conven-
tion’. Therefore, this option rule is deemed contrary to Article 13 ECHR ‘because
the Italian legal system has not offered the applicant sufficient safeguards against
arbitrariness and the person concerned has not had at its disposal an effective
remedy to enforce its grievance at the national level’.104
The above rulings suffice to observe that the principle of effectiveness of
judicial protection is an instrument for the order and reduction of the complexity
of private law which requires today, as when it originated at its origins, the wise
work of laws -makers and the Courts and judges.105
6 Contemporaneity and legal certainty
We need to acknowledge the historicity of the value of certainty and deal with the
problems of a new and different type of law. A law ‘increasingly less legal’ and
101 ECHR, 8 April 2014, Dhahbi-Italy. On the criteria established by the ECrtHR in this decision
on the duty to ask the CJEU for a preliminary reference, see C. Lacchi, ‘The ECrtHR’s Interference
in the Dialogue between National Courts and the Court of Justice of the EU: Implications for the
Preliminary Reference Procedure’ Review of European Administrative Law 8 (2015) 95–125.
102 ECJ, 15 January 2014, ibid.
103 ECJ, Grand Chamber, 19 July 2012, Littlewoods v Her Majesty’s Commissioners, points 27, 28,
31 and reference to rulings, 7 January 2004, case 201/02, Wels, 19 September 2006, cases 392/04
and 422/04.
104 ECHR, 4 February 2014, n 25376/06, Ceni v Italy, points 98, 99, 100, 101 and the reference to
ECHR, 6 June 2013, n 38450/05, Sabanchiyeva et al v Russia and to ECHR, 20 June 2002, n 50963
/99Al-Nashif v Bulgaria.
105 These points have already beenmade in Vettori, n 66 above, 153 et seq.
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more and more entrusted to domestic and European constitutional principles106
and to new techniques of legal reasoning, partly to be built in part in the new
dialogue between legal sciences and Court practice. Some brief remarks with
regard to the first and second aspect will suffice.
19th century French commentators107 had a very clear view of the value of
security and freedom of trade ‘qui exige qu’on ne puisse facilement revenir contre
les conventions’.108 The stability of contract entered the Code Civil, yet Article 6
made it conditional upon a control of validity delimited by principles (of public
order and morality) that required requiring the search, on the part of positive law,
for what was useful and right, for the purposes and conditions outlining its legal
regime.109
In Italy, legal positivism in the early decades following the Second World
War110 guaranteed certainty of law by stabilizing the values expressed by the new
democratic system and contributed, in the period of the economic miracle, to
strengthening the State as the sole source of law and as an institution capable of
ensuring the country’s rebirth.111 The balance collapsed at the end of the Sixties
with the bursting of protests, the spreading of political instability and the con-
solidation of a new function of the State and of law.
The insufficiency of a single structural vision of reality was felt, and a new
view values was attributed to the individual function,112 to the conduct and to
106 Grossi, n 2 above, ibid. The late Norbert Reich offered an instructive analysis in this regard of
the role of the proportionality principle: How Proportionate is the Proportionality Principle?, in
H.-W. Micklitz and B. De Witte (eds), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the
Member States (Portland: Intersentia, 2012) 83–111.
107 R.J. Pothier, Traitè des obligations (Bruxelles: Tome premier, 1835) 26.
108 J. Ghestin, in Traité de droit civil, Le Contrat: formation (Paris: Générale de Droit et de
Jurisprudence, 1988) 178 et seq.
109 Ghestin, n 108 above, though in a historical and comparative prospective, see the essays by
A. Rieg, Le rôle de la volonté dans l’acte juridique en droit civil français et allemand (Paris: Pichon
& Durand-Anzias, 1961); J.P. Dawson, ‘Unconscionable coercion: the German version’Harvard
Law Review 1975, 1041; J. Gordley, ‘Equality in exchange’ California Law Review 1981, 1587.
G. Vettori, ‘Autonomia privata e contratto giusto’Rivista diritto privato 2000, 21 et seq.
110 N. Bobbio, Il positivismo Giuridico, Lezioni di filosofia del diritto (collected by N. Mora, Turin:
Giappichelli, 1960). The author, in paragraph 32 page 151 et seq, concluded: ‘legal positivism can
be considered under three perspectives. a) a certain way of approaching law; b) a certain theory of
law; c) a certain ideology of law’.
111 N. Bobbio, Dalla struttura alla funzione. Nuovi studi di teoria del diritto (con Prefazione di
G. Losano, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2007, reprint) VI.
112 For an effective synthesis, see S. Orlando, ‘Fattispecie, comportamenti, rimedi. Per una
teoria del fatto dovuto’ Rivista trimestrale diritto processuale civile 4 (2011) 1033 and G. Vettori,
‘Diritti, principi e tecnica rimediale nel dialogo fra le Corti’ Europa e diritto privato 2011, 237 et seq.
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fairness. The philosophy in France,113 Germany114 and America115 started a post-
positivistic phase that was more suitable for complex legal systems, where the
line between moral rule and legal rule was becoming increasingly blurred.
In the last decades of the century, the decline of statutes was made evident
especially by two phenomena in particular:116 the impossibility for Institutions to
impose rules on a financial capitalism capable of concentrating its power in a few
invisible centres, and the mistrust of the relationship between voting and repre-
sentation.117
This affected our views on the ‘given and accepted’ system of order that is
now missed. The pyramid described by Article 1 of the Italian Civil Code and
Article 12 of the Italian General Provisions has now been replaced by different and
complementary sources. The Constitution, the Community European system and
international obligations are implemented by law but also by national, Commu-
nity European and international Courts liaising with each other. Now the Fiscal
Compact imposes strong limits on even the political action of States.118
The essence of legality changes and this change means that the rule is to be
identified in a qualitatively different scenario, resorting to principles and general
clauses where the mingling between logos and nomos, between rules and reason-
ableness, is often inseparable, for the precept must be contextualized in the
dispute, governed by heterogeneous sources, where the ‘steps’ of normativity do
not give immediate responses. This does not evoke the ideological choice that was
typical of legal positivism;119 rather, it only expresses the complexity of a society
to be ordered differently from the past.
113 J. Ghestin, ‘L’utile e le juste dans le contracts’ Archives de philosophie du droit 1981, 35 et seq.
114 G. Husserl, Recht und Zeit (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1955) and references of L. Mengo-
ni, ‘Diritto e tempo’ Jus 1998, 635 et seq now in Scritti I, n 81 above, 13.
115 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1978); N. Muffato (ed), R. Dworkin,
I diritti presi sul serio (new Italian edition, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010); R. Dworkin, Justice in Robes
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006); R. Dworkin, La giustizia in
toga (Rome Bari: Laterza, 2010), andDiritto e morale, 3 et seq; Trenta anni dopo, 204 et seq.
116 J.-W. Müller, L’enigma democrazia (Italian translation, Turin: Einaudi, 2012) X et seq.
117 It has been rightly said that in the 20th century, extraordinary transformations took place
(from oil lamp lighting to the Internet) that could not but affect our political and social system.
A. Schiavone,Non ti delego (Milan: Rizzoli, 2013) 24 et seq; 56 et seq; 64 et seq.
118 G. Vettori, ‘Il tempo dei diritti’ Persona e Mercato 2013, 179, in www.personaemercato.it; ibid
‘the adverse and favourable phases of the economic cycle’, the budget balance and the limits to
public spending, have become ordering principles of European Treaties and of the national
constitution. It remains to be seen how such choices will affect the content of rights since they
weigh heavily and aggravate insidious critical issues.
119 Bobbio, n 110 above, 151 et seq and n 3. See also R. Alexy, The Argument from Injustice: a
Reply to Legal Positivism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, English translation of Begriff und Geltung des
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As it has been clearly said, the end of statutorily-governed situations required
by laws and of law based on predictability and abstraction does not put an end to
the work of jurists; rather, it only requires the shift from the law to principles and
values to adopt the manners and techniques of a new legal reasoning, partly to be
built but which presses and has been ‘behind-the-scenes’ for at least fifty years.
What is happening today is clear.
The shape itself of our democracy itself is changing.120 The Constitutional
State is increasingly placing the legislative function and the implementation of
rules and principles on an equal footing.
Both the present and future are marked by this difficult yet unavoidable
balance, in which the reasoning and action of all social sciences will be engaged.
Rechts, 1992). However, note that, on this point, Raz has stressed that Alexy’s views about
positivism are dissatisfactory: J. Raz, ‘The Argument from Justice, or How not to Reply to Legal
Positivism’, in G. Pavlakos (ed),Law, Rights and Discourse (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 17–35.
120 M. Fioravanti, ‘La trasformazione costituzionale’ Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico 2
(2014) 295; M. Fioravanti, ‘Legge costituzionale: il problema storico della garanzia dei diritti’
Quaderni fiorentini 43 (2014) 1077 et seq.
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